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1.  Introduction 
  
This paper analyses public cash transfers in Latin American countries, focusing on their targeting and 
conditionality components. Since the mid 1990s, governments across the region adopted cash 
transfers explicitly aimed at reducing poverty and at reaching population groups largely excluded 
from formal social protection policies.
2
 In addition to being targeted, such income transfers are 
commonly characterised by a conditionality component. That is, they are paid to the eligible poor, 
provided they follow a pre-specified course of action. 
 
More recently, two developments have led to lively debates regarding the policy implications that 
emerge from the conditional cash transfer (CCT) experience in Latin America and specifically to the 
role of targeting and conditionality in cash transfers. First, efforts to strengthen social protection and 
the introduction of cash transfers in low income countries facing high institutional and financial 
constraints have raised questions regarding the appropriateness of alternative targeting methods 
and of including a conditionality component. Second, in countries which have implemented cash 
transfers for some years, policymakers are taking stock of implications arising from the experience to 
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date as they consider the “fine-tuning” of CCT policy design parameters.   Against this backdrop, this 
paper makes two contributions.   
 
First, it reviews the evidence available to date on the poverty and inequality impacts of CCTs, paying 
close attention to the contribution of separate CCT components.  The expansion of CCTs in Latin 
America has rested largely on evaluations highlighting their good targeting performance and 
progress achieved towards intended outcomes in terms of combined programme effects. 
Remarkably little evidence however supported the arguments in favour of the adoption of specific 
targeting practices and conditionality. Drawing on the experience of nine countries in Latin America, 
the paper highlights the variations in cash transfer component design and implementation and 
identifies the intended and unintended effects of alternative parameter design details. CCTs 
reviewed by the paper include (by country and start date): Bolsa Família (Brazil, 2001/2003); Chile 
Solidario-Programa Puente (Chile, 2002); Familias en Acción-FA (Colombia, 2001); Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano-BDH (Ecuador, 2003); Red Solidaria (El Salvador, 2005); Programa de Asignación 
Familiar-PRAF (Honduras, Phase I 1990 and Phase II 1998); PROGRESA-Oportunidades (Mexico, 1997 
and 2002); Red de Protección Social-RPS (Nicaragua, 2000 and 2003) and Tekoporã (Paraguay, 2005). 
 
Second, the paper discusses the policy implications arising from the experience of Latin American 
countries by contrasting evidence on CCT component effects with the claims about their intended 
outcomes and by linking design and implementation information to CCT outcomes. For example, the 
adoption of cash transfers with behavioural requirements was supported by the understanding that 
conditionalities would address the “intergenerational transmission of poverty” and held promise in 
tackling poverty in the long-term. In the CCT experience in Latin American countries, has the 
inclusion of conditionality contributed to improvements in human capital outcomes? If so, what 
does the evidence suggest about the design and implementation details that have facilitated the 
intended outcomes?  
 
The paper is organised as follows. First, it identifies the central arguments in favour of and against 
targeting and conditionality in poverty reduction programmes. Second, it highlights the variations in 
policy parameters in the CCT experience in Latin American countries to reveal the multitude of 
design and implementation options in practice. Third, it reviews the evidence on CCT poverty and 
inequality outcomes in terms of income, education and health. This section reports on overall 
programme impacts and on estimates, where they are available, of the effects of separate CCT 
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components. Fourth, the paper discusses the potential linkages between policy outcomes and the 
design and implementation details highlighted in the previous section, arguing that identifying such 
linkages is central to any informed discussion on policy. This is the paper’s main contribution to the 
ERD’s 2010 analysis of policy options in strengthening social protection in less developed countries 
(LDCs). 
 
 
2.  Targeting, conditionality and public cash transfers: A review of the arguments  
 
The adoption of cash transfers that are targeted and conditional in Latin American countries was 
largely supported by the promise such policies hold to address poverty both in the short and long 
run (Britto, 2005). This perceived potential is captured by a widely cited definition of CCTs, which 
also points to the purposes of their subcomponents: “The cash transfer is aimed at providing short-
term assistance to families in extreme poverty (...) while the conditionalities aim to promote longer 
term human capital investments, especially among the young” (Rawlings, 2004).  
 
CCTs were additionally supported by administrative and political economy claims. Commentators 
argued that CCTs displayed a reasonably low cost (Morley and Coady, 2003; World Bank, 2004). 
Furthermore, tying assistance to school attendance would make it politically possible to transfer far 
larger amounts of resources from the rest of society to the poor than would be the case without 
such condition (Morley and Coady, 2003).     
 
While intuitively attractive, these claims do not in fact reflect the full range of concerns and trade-
offs associated with alternative targeting and conditionality practices. These are briefly summarised 
here and are grouped around three sets of considerations: administrative, behavioural and political 
economy. The empirical basis of these arguments is explored in Section 4, which critically examines 
the evidence available to date on the effects of targeting and conditionality in public cash transfers, 
focusing on administrative and behavioural considerations.
3
  
 
Arguments in favour of targeting emphasise its potential to concentrate resources on vulnerable 
groups disproportionately affected by risks that are not addressed by universal spending. Such 
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considerations have prompted policy discussions to turn to narrow targeting as a means of achieving 
higher impacts on poverty (van de Walle, 1998). Yet targeting practices are also associated with 
individual responses and incentive effects, administrative costs and political economy effects that 
risk offsetting progress in poverty reduction.  
 
By distinguishing between the poor or eligible and the non-poor or ineligible, targeting may generate 
an incentive for individuals to modify their behaviour in order to qualify for a programme. Targeted 
income transfers that display high rates of benefit withdrawal risk generating a work disincentive 
and a “poverty trap”, such that people have little inducement to increase their income (Atkinson, 
1995). As the review of targeting practices in the following sections highlights, in practice, targeting 
design and implementation details may mitigate the risks of work disincentives associated with 
narrow targeting. Governments may taper the withdrawal of benefits, so that a unit increase in 
income say, above the eligibility threshold does not automatically imply loss of entitlement to the 
benefit. Income transfer payment may also be set for a specific duration, independently of variations 
in beneficiaries’ socioeconomic circumstances.  
 
Targeting involves the regular identification of beneficiaries and management of beneficiary data 
including its verification and reassessment over time. A government’s capacity to target benefits 
depends on the information available to it and the extent to which it can verify information supplied 
by others (Atkinson, 1995). Difficulties encountered by governments in assessing and verifying 
claimant’s means generate administrative costs that increase with the informational demands and 
complexity of the procedures of verification and recertification processes (Besley and Kanbur, 1990). 
They also generate social costs including low take-up, social fragmentation and tensions that 
increase with the administrative complexity of targeting (Hernanz et al, 2006).  
 
From a political economy perspective, arguments in favour of narrow targeting underscore its 
potential for securing public support for a programme by identifying population sub-groups that are 
deemed to be somehow “deserving”. Yet the political economy literature points to the ways in 
which narrow targeting may jeopardise public support for social programmes and hence the 
redistributive budget available. Finely targeted policies leading to lower leakage to the middle 
classes would draw support primarily from those below the poverty line. In contrast, universalist 
schemes, by increasing the number of beneficiaries, become the interest of additional groups, 
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promote their protection and the available redistributive budget (Besley and Kanbur, 1990; Gelbach 
and Pritchett, 2002; Sen, 1995).  
 
Similarly, arguments on conditionality may be grouped around behavioural, administrative and 
political economy considerations. The inclusion of conditionality in cash transfers is commonly 
justified to influence beneficiary behaviour to favour outcomes deemed to be beneficial to 
individuals or to society at large (Bastagli, 2008b; De Brauw and Hoddinott, 2008). For example, 
conditions can address the distortion of choices that arise when myopia or information asymmetry 
lead individuals to make decisions that do not take into account the mid to long term benefits of 
human capital accumulation. Poor knowledge of the benefits of health care check-ups, pre-natal 
treatment and other types of preventative health care might bring individuals to underutilise health 
services.  The inclusion of a behavioural requirement in terms of regular health care visits would 
address this distortion.  
 
Conditionality has also been motivated to address intra-household bargaining processes to 
strengthen the position of individuals with weak or no bargaining power. Das et al (2004) illustrate 
this case in relation to child labour, where parents favour higher income in the short-term over 
potential long-term returns from increased school attendance. In such cases, the motivation for the 
inclusion of school enrolment and attendance behavioural requirements for school-aged children 
rests on its ability to address the differences between child and parent preferences.   
 
At the same time, conditionality may generate high administrative costs. Conditionality 
administration requires the regular collection of information regarding beneficiary behaviour, the 
verification of compliance and the implementation of responses to non-compliance. These are 
administratively demanding activities that may display high costs, especially where constraints on 
regular information collection, transmission and management are high. 
 
Furthermore, conditionality may act as an additional screening or targeting device when non-
compliance leads to beneficiary exclusion from programme participation. A related concern is its 
potential generation of exclusion errors, whereby the eligible are excluded from the programme. If 
conditions burden low income households with behavioural requirements that they are not able to 
comply with, they risk screening out eligible households. The risk of exclusion as a result of non-
compliance, moreover, may disproportionately affect particular vulnerable groups. Poorer 
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households or individuals facing high opportunity costs in meeting conditions, determined by low 
resources and limited access to services, may experience a higher risk of exclusion from conditional 
transfers. 
 
From a political economy perspective, advocates of conditionality emphasise its role in legitimising 
cash transfers politically. According to such claims, CCTs are more acceptable to policy-makers and 
tax-payers than unconditional schemes. In this view, by increasing political acceptability, conditions 
would also increase the budget size and sustainability of a programme (De Janvry and Saudoulet, 
2006).  Yet if we consider that conditionality acts as an additional screening device, the literature on 
the political economy of targeting serves as a reference and the argument is reversed as, according 
to this literature, more narrowly targeted policies risk losing support from the middle classes, 
leading to smaller budgets for the targeted programmes (Besley and Kanbur, 1990).  
 
 
3.  Conditional cash transfers: Design and implementation  
 
Debates on public cash transfers often focus on broad design choices such as whether to target or 
not, whether to condition or not. In reality, policy design options may be more subtle. Income 
transfers vary by degree of targeting and targeting complexity. When they include conditions, they 
vary depending on the definitions and enforcement of behavioural requirements. The comparison of 
CCT targeting and conditionality parameters highlights the variety of design options available to 
governments. The review of the implementation of targeting and conditionality practices provides 
examples of the challenges encountered at different stages of policy administration and sheds light 
on the policy determinants of CCT outcomes. 
 
3.1  Cash transfer parameter design   
 
All CCTs reviewed here pursue a poverty reduction objective. Yet the emphasis on how this is to be 
achieved varies and shapes programme component design details. The inclusion of a transfer and 
conditions suggests that all CCTs aim to reduce poverty through both immediate income support 
and by promoting human capital outcomes. However, in some cases, priority is awarded to the 
human capital accumulation objective. In others, the provision of a minimum income nationally is a 
central concern. As will become evident over the following paragraphs, in a number of countries the 
7 
 
determination of CCT programme parameters has been characterised more by ambiguity than clarity 
about main programme aims, leading to contradictions and misguided expectations regarding 
potential programme impact.  
 
The cash transfer  
CCT transfer amounts as a share of beneficiary income or expenditures vary from about 20% of 
beneficiary household annual expenditures in Mexico/PROGRESA and Nicaragua/RPS (Maluccio, 
2003), to about 10% of beneficiaries’ monthly income in Brazil/Bolsa Familia (Bastagli, 2008a), to 6-
7% of the total income of households covered by the programme in Chile/Chile Solidario (Galasso, 
2006) and 4% of beneficiary consumption in Honduras/PRAF (Flores, 2003).  
 
The regulation of transfer amounts varies depending on whether they are subject to an adjustment 
or uprating rule. Mexico’s Oportunidades is indexed to inflation (Cohen et al, 2006a). Bolsa Familia 
benefit values are increased in an ad hoc fashion. Mean real income transfer values fell by 10% 
between 2001 and 2005 and benefits were increased in 2007 for the first time since the introduction 
of the Bolsa Familia in 2003 (Paes de Barros et al, 2009). In Honduras, during PRAF I, real transfer 
values dropped by 30% and for PRAF II, values were indexed to inflation. 
 
Transfer amounts may include phasing-out schemes. In Nicaragua, the RPS declines in value over 
three years. In Chile’s Programa Puente, the bono de proteccion value falls every six months during 
the two years that beneficiary families are entitled to the transfer. In Brazil, Bolsa Familia payments 
are made as long as eligibility persists.  
 
CCT participation has a maximum duration when it is set for a specified amount of time and then 
withdrawn, independently of the socioeconomic circumstances of the beneficiary. Alternatively, a 
CCT may include a graduation strategy that regulates the circumstances under which beneficiaries 
leave the programme because of changes in their socioeconomic conditions. Chile’s Programa 
Puente and Nicaragua’s RPS both have maximum duration periods (two years and three years 
respectively). When there is no maximum time limit for participation, CCT regulation typically 
includes a recertification or reassessment process whereby beneficiary information used to 
determine eligibility is verified. 
 
8 
 
Targeting  
CCTs are paid to broad segments of the total population in Brazil (26%) and Mexico (15%). 
Conversely, CCTs are narrowly targeted to population subgroups in Chile (6% of the total 
population), Colombia (5%) and Nicaragua (3%). They also vary depending on the share of the poor 
population targeted. CCTs aim to reach all the extreme poor in Brazil and Mexico, all the poor with 
children in Brazil or all the extreme poor with children Chile, Colombia and Nicaragua. 
 
CCTs may rely on geographic targeting to target priority areas, whether based on welfare levels or 
on other requirements such as minimum infrastructure facilities, or a combination of both. In 
Colombia, Familias en Accion (FA) is implemented in poor municipalities with fewer than 100,000 
inhabitants, a bank and adequate education and health infrastructure (Attanasio et al, 2005). 
Similarly, in Nicaragua, RPS was initially implemented in departments that satisfied minimum 
administrative and infrastructure requirements (Maluccio and Flores, 2005). Beneficiary selection 
relies on proxy-means testing when, rather than relying on reported monetary income, information 
on other correlates of poverty is collected to compute a welfare score used to rank potential 
beneficiaries. The potential advantages of this targeting technique over relying on declared income 
rest on the selection of poverty correlates that are easily verifiable, helping to avoid the problems of 
income misreporting and work disincentives generated by straightforward income means tests. 
Most Latin American CCTs rely on proxy-means tests. A notable exception is Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, 
which relies on self-declared per capita household income. 
 
Targeting practices also vary depending on the regulation of beneficiary reassessment or 
recertification processes and the associated question of programme duration and exit or 
“graduation”. In countries where programme participation is an entitlement as long as eligibility 
criteria persist, CCT administration requires the regular recertification of beneficiary records. Mexico 
and Brazil have set maximum time limits within which beneficiary records must be validated: every 
three years and every two years respectively.  
 
It is worth noting that these are maximum time limits, in some countries they are set as 
administrative benchmarks for regulating and monitoring the performance of administrators 
responsible for the management of beneficiary databases. By regulation, and despite maximum time 
limits for beneficiary recertification, in some CCTs loss of eligibility as a result of changes in the 
socioeconomics and demographic circumstances of beneficiaries determines termination of 
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programme participation. This is the case in Brazil, where beneficiaries are required to report 
changes in their circumstances, including household composition and income. If these imply the loss 
of eligibility, by design at least, Bolsa Familia beneficiaries are no longer entitled to the income 
transfer. It follows that by design the Bolsa Familia generates a 100% benefit withdrawal rate 
(Bastagli, 2008a).
4
  
 
Conditionality  
Conditionality requires beneficiaries to follow some pre-specified course of action. In the Latin 
American experience, conditionalities are typically set in the areas of education and health. School-
aged children in beneficiary households are required to attend school for a minimum amount of 
time in the school week. Pregnant and nursing women and young children are required to regularly 
attend health clinics for check-ups and to maintain an up-to-date vaccination booklet. Some CCTs 
have additional behavioural requirements, commonly targeting the mothers in beneficiary 
households. PROGRESA for example, requires beneficiary mothers to attend workshops on health 
and programme coordinators’ meetings and to contribute to a set amount of hours of work to the 
programme (Molyneux, 2006). 
 
Conditionality in CCTs also varies depending on the centrality it occupies in programme operation. It 
is central to CCT implementation when compliance is first verified and benefit payments are only 
subsequently made (Mexico). In other countries, once eligibility is determined, transfer payments 
are made to beneficiaries and conditionality compliance is verified at later stages (Brazil).   
 
Finally, mechanisms of response to non-compliance also vary. In some CCTs, non-compliance leads 
directly to beneficiary suspension from programme participation.  This is the case in Chile’s 
Programa Puente, where bono payments are terminated if a family does not meet its commitments. 
In Brazil, where a beneficiary’s failure to comply with conditionality is understood as a “flag of 
additional vulnerability”, in the first instance the response to non-compliance includes verification of 
the reasons for non-compliance and the beneficiary is entitled to additional support and 
personalised services from the municipal authorities. Only if non-compliance persists over time for 
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five consecutive monitoring cycles and justifications for non-compliance are not provided, is benefit 
payment initially suspended and eventually terminated (MDS, 2009).  
 
3.2  Implementation  
 
Policy implementation does not automatically follow from official policy regulation. Information on 
the departures of CCT parameter administration from formal design in practice may be useful in 
understanding policy performance and in the interpretation of findings of policy impact evaluations. 
Variations of this kind arise from challenges encountered in policy implementation. They also result 
from differences in people’s perceptions of policy parameter definitions and motivations from those 
intended by policymakers and enshrined in policy legislation. 
 
With regards to transfer-subsidy payments, early CCT assessments reveal that the supply side 
payments in some countries were not executed in practice. In Honduras for example, Glewwe and 
Olinto (2004) explain that despite including transfers to service providers by design, in practice PRAF 
did not execute such payments and efforts to improve service provision as part of the CCT were not 
implemented during the early years of PRAF implementation.  
 
In the implementation of CCT targeting, the management of CCT beneficiary information, including 
the regular verification and updating of beneficiary records, has encountered challenges that have 
led to a gradual implementation of programme rules in many countries. For example, in Mexico’s 
PROGRESA, by design the eligibility status of households was supposed to be reviewed within three 
years after a household’s entry into the programme. In fact, more than five years elapsed before any 
effort was made to revise the list of beneficiaries (Skoufias and Di Maro, 2007). In Brazil, 21% of 
beneficiary records in the national Cadastro Unico registry used for the identification of Bolsa Familia 
beneficiaries were “valid” in 2005, that is, contained information which had been recently verified 
and updated.
5
 The share of valid Cadastro Unico records has since increased and reached 85% in 
2008 (MDS, 2009).  
 
Studies of the implementation of CCT targeting practices also highlight the mixed levels of 
understanding of the eligibility requirements among benefit claimants and local administrators. 
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Findings from a qualitative study of RPS implementation in Nicaragua, reveals that targeting was a 
poorly-understood element of the programme: “...in particular, very few people understood the 
basis for the household targeting and why they were included or excluded” (Adato, 2008). Similarly, 
limited understanding and confusion regarding CCT eligibility criteria among the public are reported 
in El Salvador, Paraguay and Brazil during the early years of programme implementation (Veras 
Soares and Britto, 2007; Bastagli, 2008a).  
 
People’s perceptions of the definitions and motivation for conditionality vary from official 
conditionality regulation. In Brazil, interviews with teachers reveal the widespread practice for 
absent beneficiary children to be marked as present (Bastagli, 2008a). Teachers explained their 
reluctance to additionally penalise poor children, revealing that their understanding of Bolsa Familia 
conditionality differs substantially from the official regulation of conditions in Brazil.
6
  
 
The monitoring of conditionalities, involving the regular collection and transmission of information 
on beneficiary behaviour, has not been consistently implemented as outlined by programme 
regulation. In Paraguay, where the Tekopora programme was introduced in 2005, conditionality 
monitoring remained broadly not implemented in 2007 (Veras Soares and Britto, 2007). In Brazil, 
administrative records of health conditionality compliance were first drawn together in 2005 and 
reported 6% of Bolsa Familia beneficiaries with health monitoring records (not necessarily 
complying). In 2009, health conditionality compliance records covered 63% of Bolsa Familia 
beneficiaries (MDS, 2009).  
 
The gradual and irregular implementation of conditionality monitoring has had implications for the 
execution of the procedures of repercussion to non-compliance, the first being a necessary 
prerequisite for the second. In practice, responses to non-compliance in some countries were not 
implemented or were only gradually administered as regular monitoring was stepped up. In Brazil, 
the first cancellation of Bolsa Familia benefits as a result of conditionality non-compliance took place 
in 2007 (MDS, 2009).  
 
 
                                                           
6
 This has led to initiatives funded by the central government and with support from state level authorities in the form of 
special training sessions for teachers and staff at municipal secretariats to inform them of the purpose for the education 
conditionality, emphasising the non-sanctionary nature of non-compliance, at least in the first episodes of non-compliance.  
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4.  The impact of cash transfers on income poverty and inequality, education and health 
 
4.1 CCT impact: Combined effects 
 
The implementation of CCTs in Latin American countries has partially offset the historical 
“truncation” of public transfers in the region, by reaching low income groups previously excluded 
from formal social protection spending (Lindert et al, 2006).
7
 Compared with the incidence of other 
targeted transfers, CCTs are among the most progressive programmes. Coady et al (2004) compare 
targeted interventions in forty-eight countries and find that most CCTs in the sample rank in the top 
programmes in terms of targeting outcomes.  
 
However, despite coverage and distributional patterns that favour the poor, small unit subsidies 
limit the poverty and inequality impacts of CCTs. In some countries, CCT impacts on poverty are 
lower than those achieved by targeted social insurance transfers with relatively higher unit subsidies 
(Lindert et al, 2006).  In many cases, and as a result of both benefit levels and the definition of the 
target population, CCTs have proved to be quite successful at reducing the poverty gap or the 
severity of poverty, but have limited or negligible impact on the headcount ratio (Skoufias et al, 
2001). 
 
Numerous studies highlight the contribution of CCTs to income poverty and inequality reduction 
despite accounting for a relatively small shares of national GDP. In Brazil, the Bolsa Familia is the 
most progressive income source (Soares et al, 2006) and contributed to a reduction of the poverty 
gap of 12% (Bastagli, 2008a) and of inequality measured in terms of the Gini coefficient of 10% 
between 2001 and 2005 (Paes de Barros et al, 2009 ) while accounting for 0.35% of GDP. In Mexico, 
PROGRESA/Oportunidades reduced the poverty gap in rural areas by 19% and accounts for 18% 
(close to one fifth) of the post-transfers decline in the Gini coefficient between 1996 and 2006 
(Esquivel et al, 2009), despite accounting for 0.36% of GDP. In Nicaragua, the RPS reduced the 
poverty gap among beneficiaries by 18% (Maluccio and Flores, 2005), while costing approximately 
0.2% of GDP. 
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Beyond income poverty and inequality, what do we know about CCT impacts on education and 
health indicators? Studies show that in some countries CCTs have improved intermediate education 
and health indicators in terms of service utilisation. Results on outcomes are more mixed and 
limited, with evidence available mainly for one country, Mexico (e.g. see Behrman et al, 2005). 
 
CCTs have been successful in increasing rates of school enrolment and attendance and in reducing 
dropout rates. In Mexico, PROGRESA led to increases in enrolment in secondary school, reductions in 
repetition and dropout rates in primary and secondary school and years of schooling completed 
(Parker et al, 2008). In Nicaragua, Maluccio and Flores (2005) estimate that RPS led to an increase in 
school enrolment of 13 percentage points.  Impacts on school enrolment in both countries are 
higher for poorer children, suggesting that CCTs help reduce inequalities, beyond income measures.   
However, there is no evidence of significant CCT effects on learning. For Mexico, Behrman et al 
(2005) show that longer exposure to PROGRESA/Oportunidades has a positive impact on grades of 
schooling attained, but no effects on achievement tests.     
 
CCTs have led to improvements in health care service use. Studies reveal positive effects on use of 
preventive infant care, checkups during pregnancy, after birth and in early childhood. In Nicaragua, 
the probability for a poor child to be taken to health checkups and weighed in the last six months 
increased by 13 percentage points as a result of the RPS (Maluccio and Flores, 2005). In Colombia, 
the percentage of children less than 24 months old with an up-to-date schedule of healthcare visits 
increased from 17% to 40% as a result of the FA (Attanasio et al, 2005) and in Honduras, PRAF 
increased the proportion of children who had at least one preventive health visit (over the past 30 
days) by 20 percentage points (Morris et al, 2004).  
 
Evidence of CCT impact on health outcomes is mixed. In Colombia, the Familias en Accion improved 
child nutrition as measured by height-for-age (Attanasio et al, 2005). Mexico’s PROGRESA and 
Nicaragua’s RPS are also associated with improvements in child height. RPS in particular, recorded a 
powerful impact in terms of improving preschooler height and led to reductions in stunting and in 
the prevalence of children underweight (Maluccio and Flores, 2005). However, both PRAF in 
Honduras and the Bolsa Alimentacao in Brazil (one of the cash transfers consolidated into the Bolsa 
Familia in 2003), had no meaningful effects on preschool nutritional status, blood haemoglobin 
levels and rates of anemia (Hoddinott and Basset, 2008).   
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4.2 CCT impact: The contribution of separate CCT components and component costs 
 
 
As governments approach the question of which policy parameters to select in the adoption of a 
cash transfer or how to “fine-tune” existing transfers, information on the contribution of specific 
parameters and of their design details is critical. What do we know about the effects of specific CCT 
components? The results reported in the previous section assess the combined effects of all CCT 
programme components, providing limited indications of what aspects of CCTs facilitate progress 
towards target outcomes. The following paragraphs review the evidence on the effects of separate 
CCT components and include a discussion of the costs associated with targeting and conditionality 
(including administrative costs and unintended behavioural effects identified in Section 2).   
 
The incidence analysis of CCTs, as reported earlier, underscores their good targeting performance. 
Even though incidence outcomes depend on a variety of targeting features (including coverage rates 
and characteristics of the target population) and cannot be exclusively attributed to the targeting 
mechanism used, a comparison of different CCTs suggests that different beneficiary selection 
mechanisms may work equally well in terms of ensuring resources are concentrated on the target 
population.  For example, the Bolsa Familia, which relies on self-declared income for the selection of 
beneficiaries, performs as well as the best-performing CCT in terms of targeting, Chile’s Programa 
Puente, which employs a proxy-means test like most CCTs (Bastagli, 2008a).  
 
Section 2 highlighted the concern raised by targeting theory for targeted income transfers to 
generate an incentive for individuals to maintain low incomes, offsetting poverty reduction efforts. 
In the experience of Latin American countries, is CCT participation associated with reduced work 
effort among adults? Empirical investigations using data for Mexico and Brazil indicate that CCT 
programme participation in these countries is not significantly associated with adult labour supply 
decisions. Skoufias and Di Maro (2007) study whether PROGRESA/Oportunidades affects adult 
participation in the labour market and adult leisure time (over the years 1997-1999) and find that 
programme participation does not have any significant effect on either outcome. Foguel and de 
Barros (2010) estimate the effects of CCT participation on male and female adult participation rates 
and number of hours worked (over the years 2001-2005) and find that Brazilian CCT programmes do 
not have significant effects on either labour market participation or the supply of hours of men and 
women.  
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Evidence for Nicaragua’s RPS, on the other hand, reveals that CCT participation is associated with 
reduced adult work effort in the first years of programme implementation. Maluccio (2007) finds 
negative effects on labour supply of RPS beneficiary households in 2001 and 2002. His study 
however also finds no significant effects on numbers of hours worked in 2004 and suggests that a 
reduction in transfers for those entering the programme in 2004, compared to transfer values in the 
initial period of RPS implementation, may have reduced the labour supply disincentive. 
 
Targeting also entails administrative costs. These reflect targeting design and vary over time, as 
programmes encounter particular challenges or reach stages of maturity.  In Mexico’s PROGRESA, 
the identification of beneficiaries accounts for a high share of programme operational costs in the 
early years of CCT implementation (34% compared with delivery of transfers, equal to 22% and 
conditionality, 18%). Activity cost shares change over time as conditionality monitoring and 
enforcement activities are stepped up and in 2000 the identification of beneficiaries accounts for 3% 
of total PROGRESA operational costs, while conditionality activities amount to 24% (Caldes et al, 
2004).
8
 
 
Trends in CCT activity costs also highlight operational challenges encountered in programme 
implementation. This is the case for PRAF in Honduras.
9
 The administrative cost of identifying PRAF 
beneficiaries in 1999 amounted to 26% of total programme costs (excluding transfers) and 
maintained similar levels, at 25% of programme costs, in 2002. Difficulties with the transition to a 
new programme team and maintaining and updating beneficiary registration lists, Caldes et al (2004) 
explain, lie behind these trends in programme costs.    
 
In addition to economic costs, targeting may lead to social costs in the form of deepening social 
divisions. Numerous studies document the types and extent of social costs resulting from CCT 
targeting implementation in Latin American countries. Adato’s (2000) study of Mexico’s PROGRESA 
                                                           
8
 Total administrative costs as a share of the total CCT budget over the time periods indicated here amount to: 9.6% for 
PROGRESA (1997-2000), 33% for PRAF (1999-2000) and 40% for RPS (2000-2002), 40% (Caldes et al, 2004).
 
Note: For Caldes 
et al (2004) total CCT costs are given by the sum of transfers, total in-kind expenditures and total operational costs. 
Operational costs include the following CCT activities-components in analysing CCT costs: programme design and 
implementation, identification of beneficiaries (collecting, processing, validating and analysing household socioeconomic 
data), incorporation of beneficiaries, delivery of demand transfers, delivery of supply transfers, conditionality (distributing, 
collecting and processing the registration, attendance and performance forms to schools and health-care providers), 
monitoring and evaluation, external evaluation. 
9
 For both Honduras’ PRAF and Nicaragua’s RPS, it is worth noting that the largest share of programme costs was spent on 
the external evaluation:  up to 35% of total costs (excluding transfers) for PRAF and 22% for RPS (Caldes et al, 2004).  
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for example highlights the tensions arising from its targeting mechanism in the form of unease and 
resentment resulting from the distinction between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. 
 
With regards to conditionality, two recent CCT impact evaluations estimate conditionality effects on 
education. Schady and Araujo’s (2008) study of Ecuador’s Bono de Desarollo Humano (BDH) exploits 
variations in households’ perceptions of conditionality to assess the impact of conditionality on 
school enrolment. The study compares ‘conditioned’ households, which believed there was an 
enrolment requirement even though no requirements were ever monitored or enforced, with 
‘unconditioned’ households, which did not believe the transfer to be conditioned. It finds that 
significant (and limited) programme effects on enrolment are only recorded among households who 
believed there was an enrolment requirement, suggesting that the unenforced BDH schooling 
requirement has a potential causal effect on outcomes.  
 
De Brauw and Hoddinott’s (2007) study on Mexico’s PROGRESA also exploits variations in 
conditionality implementation and perceptions to analyse conditionality effects on school 
enrolment. They group households according to whether they received school enrolment and 
attendance monitoring forms and to their knowledge of the conditionality. The evaluation shows 
that the absence of monitoring forms reduced the likelihood of children attending school, pointing 
to a linkage between conditionality monitoring and school attendance. 
 
Both studies interestingly reveal that information-sharing associated with conditionality 
implementation (i.e. people’s perception or understanding that transfer receipt is conditional on 
sending children to school) and initial conditionality monitoring activities (e.g. through the 
distribution of monitoring forms) are associated with higher school enrolment and attendance.  
  
The inclusion of conditionality in cash transfers has raised concerns regarding risks of exclusion and 
additional penalisation of vulnerable groups. Poor households facing high opportunity costs in 
meeting conditions may experience a higher risk of exclusion from the programme. In their study of 
beneficiaries that left Mexico’s PROGRESA as a result of non-compliance with conditions, Alvarez et 
al (2006) find that indigenous populations and the extreme poor in communities where there is likely 
to be greater inequality have higher odds of dropping out of the programme.  Other studies still, 
have drawn attention to the ways in which conditionality imposes burdens disproportionately 
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among household members, with additional responsibilities falling mainly to mothers (Gonzalez de 
la Rocha, 2005; Molyneux, 2006).   
 
Finally, conditionality costs also arise from people’s (mis)perceptions of the definitions and purpose 
of conditionality and the related unintended behavioural effects. In Nicaragua, one of the conditions 
during the first phase of the RPS required children to gain weight. If they fell twice below an 
established weight gain, parents could be sanctioned by suspension of benefits. Adato (2008) 
reports how this requirement led to overfeeding children before they were weighed. In education, 
the RPS conditionality requiring pupils to pass their grade successfully led some schools to advance 
children to the next grade even when such a move was not merited (Maluccio, 2003).  
 
 
In sum, this section finds that both the economic and non-economic costs associated with targeting 
and conditionality deserve serious consideration in decisions regarding targeting strategies and 
conditionality design. Even if a study does, say, detect a statistically significant impact of 
conditionality on an intended outcome (e.g. on school enrolment), policymakers would need to 
weigh these benefits against the administrative and social costs of conditionality monitoring and 
enforcement. Debates on alternative parameter options will benefit from the examination of a 
broad set of variables beyond those commonly cited – either because they relate directly to 
intended programme outcomes or because they are easily measurable with available data.
10
  
 
 
5.  Conclusion: Linking CCT design, implementation and outcomes  
 
Designing a public cash transfer involves many decisions. These include setting transfer levels, 
identifying beneficiary selection strategies and deciding whether to condition or not and the nature 
of conditionalities.  As governments approach the question of which policy parameters to select 
when designing a new cash transfer and how to fine-tune existing transfers, information about the 
parameter design options available, the contribution of specific CCT parameters to outcomes, and 
the implementation details that facilitate these linkages is critical. The following paragraphs 
                                                           
10
 It may difficult to conduct a unified cost-benefit analysis of a programme precisely because of the inability to attach 
monetary valuations to certain policy outcomes. This should not prevent a discussion on alternative costs and benefits of a 
programme in the context of both policy design and assessment phases.  
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summarise the policy considerations that arise from the Latin American experience reviewed here, 
grouped around two sets of considerations, the broad design of policy and institutions and the 
details of CCT parameter design.  
 
5.1  Cash transfer objectives and institutions 
 
The design of public cash transfer parameters involves a careful balancing of competing policy 
priorities and objectives. Governments may have a priority concern for guaranteeing a minimum 
income or for promoting education and health outcomes, or both. Policy design decisions will also 
include a balancing of these objectives against others such as the containment of programme costs 
and the avoidance of disincentives. Policy parameter details are typically the result of a compromise 
between different objectives, within the context of specific financial and institutional constraints. 
When this compromise is not discussed explicitly, decisions may lead to ambiguity and 
contradictions in programme design.  
 
In the Latin American experience, lack of clarity regarding CCT objectives in some cases has 
contributed to contradictions in programme design and misguided expectations regarding potential 
outcomes. Such tensions are often compounded by the high financial and institutional constraints 
faced in some countries (Veras Soares and Britto, 2008). An initial consideration that arises from the 
Latin American experience then is that from the outset it is useful for governments to clarify the 
primary objectives pursued by a cash transfer. Clarification could be achieved around whether the 
central programme motivation is to provide an income to the poor and/or to promote human capital 
accumulation. While CCT parameter details may be defined to pursue both objectives, some CCTs 
emphasise one aim over the other and this has implications in terms of the groups targeted, 
programme duration and time limits.  
 
A second institutional dimension along which the CCT experience in Latin American countries varies 
concerns the broad regulation of CCT and of the role of actors involved in programme 
implementation. In some cases, the introduction of a CCT has been accompanied by an explicit effort 
to rationalise social assistance and poverty reduction strategies by identifying priority objectives of 
alternative programmes and designing the CCT within the broader policy framework, even in 
countries with a weak tradition in formal social protection provision. Examples include the 
consolidation of programmes, the integration of administrative registries for beneficiary selection 
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and the standardisation and simplification of policy rules. Where CCTs have been set up with limited 
coordination with existing structures and practices, they have in some cases led to overlaps and 
duplications in policy efforts and to tensions between actors.   
 
In Nicaragua, for example, Moore (2009) reports of persisting tensions between Ministry of Health 
staff and the private health providers responsible for providing services to RPS beneficiaries.
11
 
Tensions were compounded by the fact that the private providers earned higher salaries than the 
ministerial staff. Institutional frictions also arose from the regulation of RPS programme 
coordination responsibilities. These were initially executed by a special body, the Fondo Social 
Suplementario. Attempts to integrate RPS into the country’s broader social protection system, by 
transferring coordination responsibilities to the Ministry of the Family, during the programme’s 
second phase in late 2002 met with resistance (Moore, 2009). 
 
Efforts to stimulate cooperation and communication between institutions involved in CCT 
implementation have included terms of agreements between actors and government subsidies to 
programme administrators, including performance-based administrative transfers. In Brazil, terms of 
agreements specifying institutional responsibilities and promoting collaboration and information 
sharing are signed by government offices and other bodies involved in different stages of Bolsa 
Familia implementation (Bastagli, 2008a; Lindert et al, 2006). Furthermore, to support Bolsa Familia 
administration activities and to compensate for additional costs arising from such responsibilities in 
Brazil the federal government pays administrative subsidies to local authorities. Subsidy values are 
based on needs assessments and are performance-based. An early assessment of these subsidies 
suggests they are leading to a “catching up” effect among poorer municipalities (Bastagli, 2008a).  
 
Finally, CCTs vary depending on their financing arrangements. The availability of external financing 
has been crucial in initiating safety net measures, particularly in countries with weak public finances. 
It has helped legitimise programmes and has supported CCT monitoring and evaluation. Yet 
complete reliance on external financing that is guaranteed for limited periods and is subject to 
renegotiation has additional implications for CCT continuity. In some countries, it is associated with 
weak national ownership and this in turn has shaped programme development. In Nicaragua for 
                                                           
11
 Public health services capacity had been deemed insufficient to respond to the additional health service demand 
generated by programme beneficiaries and RPS relied on private health service providers. 
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example, the widespread perception that RPS was largely donor driven and a pervasive sense of 
weak national ownership contributed to its gradual dismantling and the CCT has been discontinued 
(Moore, 2009).  
 
As is true of other institutional considerations, with regards to policy financing, the CCT experience 
in Latin American countries highlights the importance of adopting a medium to long-term vision and 
prioritising institutional development. Where efforts to set up social assistance measures in Latin 
American countries (including CCTs) have been characterised by a short-term and emergency-based 
approach, developments led, in the first instance, to interventions with a limited lifespan, the 
establishment of parallel institutions and the complete reliance on external financing. The central 
challenge in these countries is the development of adequate fiscal and social protection financing 
arrangements for national social policy.    
 
5.2 The determination of cash transfer policy parameters  
 
In terms of specific CCT parameter design, the theory and evidence reviewed above highlight the 
design options, the trade-offs between alternative features and the decisions made in a number of 
countries in Latin America in response to varying policy priorities and concerns arising from policy 
implementation. 
 
With regards to the determination of the income transfer level, higher benefit values are associated 
with higher poverty impacts. At the same time, the relatively low transfer values of CCTs, compared 
with those of other public cash transfers, have been credited for minimising negative labour supply 
effects that would offset the reduction in income poverty. Risks of dependency and reduced work 
effort have also been addressed in some CCTs through the adoption of maximum time limits for 
programme participation.  
 
Governments face another trade-off when deciding on whether to introduce participation time 
limits. When human capital accumulation is stated as a primary policy objective and CCTs have a 
maximum duration of say three years, as was the case in Colombia and Nicaragua, participation is 
permitted for a period well below children’s education and health cycles. This leads to an inherent 
contradiction between policy objectives and design by severely limiting the potential for a cash 
transfer to promote human capital outcomes.  
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In practice, in several Latin American countries, cash transfer design details were modified over time 
in response to growing awareness of the tensions around cash transfer regulation and programme 
objectives. For example, in a number of countries that initially failed to uprate or revise cash transfer 
values over time, leading to the erosion of their real value and limiting their poverty reduction and 
redistributive impact, benefit uprating practices were introduced (e.g. Honduras). In countries where 
cash transfers were introduced with maximum time limits while pursuing human capital 
accumulation objectives, duration periods were revised and extended to better reflect programme 
priorities (e.g. in Colombia).  
 
In some countries CCT implementation has proceeded in tandem with the reorganisation of 
targeting tools, leading to the consolidation of beneficiary registries and to the standardisation of 
eligibility rules nationally. These reforms have led to administrative simplification and in some cases 
are associated with reductions of CCT administrative costs. Trends in CCT administrative cost 
estimates for Brazil and Mexico for example show the progressive reduction of total costs and of 
activity share costs, with targeting costs declining over time. In Mexico, PROGRESA/Oportunidades 
administrative costs declined from 57% of total outlays in 1997 (Caldes et al, 2004) to 6% in 2003 
(Lindert et al, 2006). Brazil’s CCT administrative costs declined from 14.7% (pre-reform CCTs) to 5.3% 
(Lindert et al, 2006).  
 
Beneficiary identification methods vary depending on informational requirements and these in turn 
are associated with varying administrative and social costs. In the experience of CCTs reviewed here, 
mechanisms relying on simpler requirements have proved to work as well, in terms of targeting 
performance, as more complex targeting procedures. The standardisation and simplification of 
programme rules also holds potential for minimising social tensions and fragmentation by 
guaranteeing common procedures nationally. These results reinforce some of the advantages of 
simple targeting practices. 
 
Contrary to what targeting theory predicts, in some countries, evidence points to the absence of a 
clear work disincentive effect associated with CCT participation, even where by design the transfer 
generates a high marginal tax rate. Difficulties encountered in the regular re-evaluation of 
beneficiaries (see Section 3) may have contributed to this result by generating a “fuzzy” 
implementation of targeting, whereby in practice, changes in the socioeconomic circumstances of 
beneficiaries are not immediately recorded and do not automatically lead to the suspension of  
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benefit payments even when eligibility levels are surpassed. As means testing is stepped up as a 
result of the closer implementation of programme targeting design over time, whether these results 
hold remains an open question. The potential negative incentive effects warrant a re-examination as 
means testing and eligibility rules are more strictly enforced.     
 
In a number of Latin American countries, the definition of conditionality in cash transfers has been 
revised to take unintended behavioural effects into account. In Nicaragua for example, RPS 
conditionality requiring beneficiary children to successfully pass their grades was suspended once it 
was observed that this condition was associated with schoolteachers promoting beneficiary children 
to secure their benefit receipt (Maluccio and Flores, 2005). Concerns that conditionality may 
additionally penalise vulnerable households have led to the adoption of features aimed at 
minimising its sanctionary nature towards beneficiaries. These include processes of verification of 
the reasons for non compliance and initiatives to assist beneficiaries in complying with behavioural 
requirements. 
 
Evidence of the partial implementation of conditionality in practice (i.e. irregular or no monitoring of 
compliance and failure to implement responses to non-compliance, see Section 3), coupled with the 
positive impact of CCTs on the use of services, suggests that communicating the desired behaviour in 
terms of school attendance and health care visits to the public at large contributes to the intended 
behavioural effects, independently of the full implementation of conditionality, at least during the 
early years of policy implementation.  
 
Evidence of impact on education and health outcomes remains mixed and points to the importance 
of government commitment to improving service quality. Results available for Mexico’s PROGRESA-
Oportunidades for example show that longer exposure to school has no effect on achievement test 
scores (Behrman et al, 2005). An initial test of links between school characteristics, measured in 
terms of student/teacher ratios and educational outcomes measured in terms of grades of schooling 
attainment finds that impacts differ with the quality of schooling available (Behrman et al, 2005).  
 
In the area of health too, limited results on outcomes are associated with weak service provision and 
quality. Hoddinott and Basset (2008) hypothesise for example that shortages and incomplete 
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deliveries of iron supplements in Honduras help explain the absence of PRAF impact on rates of 
anemia (see Section 4).  
 
The Latin American CCT examples indicate that the potential for CCTs to promote human capital 
outcomes may be usefully aided by supply-side interventions aimed at improving service provision 
and quality. A government’s commitment to improved services may be an essential ingredient for 
cash transfers and conditionality to function as intended.  
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